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DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation; COPPER STATE
THRIFT & LOAN CO., a Utah corporation; COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN,
a Utah corporation; VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; WESTERN SAVINGS AND LOAN COMPANY, a Utah corporation;

INDICO, a Utah corporation d/b/a

INDICO

DISTRIBUTING

COMPANY; BRENT IVIE ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah corporation; DESERET
PACIFIC MORTGAGE, a Utah corporation; SCOTT A. KAFESJIAN; DOUGLAS
C. BRADSHAW; HUGO F. DIEDRICH; CAROLYN L. NIELSEN; DENNIS J.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
No. 860340
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO.,
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO.
Defendants/Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
Respondents attempt, in Sections III through VI of their
Arguments, to have this Court decide this case upon issues not
ruled on by the trial court or brought before the trial court and
not appealed here by Appellant nor cross appealed by Respondents.
Respondents raise issues on appeal not ruled on by the trial court
regarding whether the lien notices complied with the relevant
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, whether the lien was untimely
filed, and whether the releases of the lien were valid.

Finally,

Respondents raise the issue for the first time on appeal that they
are entitled to attorneys fees.
As authority for such a position, Respondents rely on Global
Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co.,
- 1 -

614 P.2d 155

(Utah 1980).

However, such reliance is in error since this case

does not meet the requirements stated in that case to justify
such a decision by this Court.

Global states a four-part test,

to determine whether this Court is to decide cases upon grounds
other

than

those

relied

requirements are 1)
trial court, 2)
on appeal, 3)

upon the trial

court.

The

four

the issues must have been presented to the

the issues must have been briefed by the parties
the issues must have been argued by both parties

on appeal, and 4)

a resolution of the issues must not require

that there be determinations of fact which were not made by the
trial court.
The only element of this four-part test which is met in this
case is that the issues Respondents present in Sections III
through V of their brief were presented to the trial court in
memoranda submitted to the trial in support or in opposition to
the motions for summary judgment.

The trial court made no

findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to these
issues.

The trial court did not base its decision upon these

issues.

And neither the Appellant nor the Respondents have

appealed based upon those issues.
briefed these issues.

Furthermore, Appellant has not

Therefore, to the extent that Respondents'

Brief addresses issues not addressed nor ruled upon by the trial
court, nor appealed by any parties to this appeal, Appellant will
not burden this Court by replying to those issues.
As to Section VI of Respondents' Brief, Appellant notes that
the issue of attorneys fees has never been presented to the trial
- 2 -

court

and

thus,

this Court

is precluded

from

considering

the

issue.
I. ISSUES SET FORTH IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF WERE INCLUDED
IN THE PLEADINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND AS SUCH ARE
PROPER ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT.
R e s p o 1111 «i • 111 " i ""

i
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Appellant*s brief regarding whether the failure of the notary on
Appellant's

Notices

J Men

t

set forth the expiration date of
county of the notary's

residence invalidated said Notices under the relevant statues are
not properly before this Court is without merit.
i I the uulfcSttl, il

hp stated that the issue regarding the

jurat was set forth in th*- pleadings i i was in fact <•- r i^is for
the lower courtf s decisic
Judgment.
page
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Judge Judith Billings in her Memorandum Decision, at
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"This Court

finds that the failure to set
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notary's place of

residence and the date upon which the notary's commission expires
renders the notarization ineffective under Section 4f»-l -H, utili
»IM1O

'"uiiii

(14S3) "

Obviously

I he issue was properly raised at

the lower court level and as such, the issue is properly before
this Court,
I i J i I h t-f i
regarding
residence

the a r g u m e n t s

the notary's
an ' • ie u a i e

presented
The

issue was

in s u p p o r t

failure
i

f hi

i^wer re ii• ,
*

^

t o set

briefed

of Appellant's
forth

tholi

position
place

of

i romm issi on i?j<piM-u! \ /oie

ppellant's Motion to Reconsider.
^.. the Memorandum

. 3 .

Supporting

the

Motion to Reconsider and supporting affidavits were submitted to
the district court.
As the Motion to Reconsider and the Memorandum Supporting the
Motion were filed in the district court prior to the time the
court denied Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, it must be assumed
that the lower court made its decision after reviewing the file.
Thus, the lower court had an opportunity to review the arguments
regarding the issue now on appeal regarding the failure of the
jurat to set forth the expiration date of the notary commission
and residence.
In addition, as the Motion to Reconsider and the Memorandum
Supporting the Motion, as well as the affidavits were filed with
the district court,
appeal.

said documents are a part of the record on

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a) states that

the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court
constitute the record on appeal.

The Committee Note to Rule 11

states that "the record on appeal incudes all of the original
papers filed in the district court . . . and the supreme court can
rely on any material contained in the district court's original
file."

It is obvious from this Note that Appellant's arguments

with respect to the issue regarding the failure of the jurat to
set forth the commission expiration date and residence were
properly presented to the trial court in the original papers filed
in the trial court by Appellant and are considered a part of the
record

on

appeal

and

as

such

Court.
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may

be

reviewed

by

this

Respondents cited Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah
1983) as supporting their position that the issue regarding the
jurat may not be heard by this Court.

However, this case can be

easily distinguished from the instant matter.

In Utah County,

the appellants neither complained to the trial court as to the
sum

deposited

in

the

court

nor

raised

as

an

issue

the

noncompliance of the County until the matter came to trial three
and one-half years later.

Utah's Supreme Court thus ruled that

the appellants had waived their right to raise the issue at the
appellate level by failing to raise the issue at any time to the
lower court.

Utah County at 85.

Nevertheless, in the instant case, the issue had been
considered by the trial court in rendering its decision with
respect to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Further, the

arguments raised by Appellant in its brief were presented to the
trial court in a timely manner in its Motion to Reconsider.
Obviously, Appellant has not waived its right to raise this issue
as the issue was brought in a timely manner before the trial
court.
With respect to the affidavits submitted along with the
Motion

to

Reconsider,

Appellant

merely

submits

that

the

affidavits are a part of the record on appeal and that according
to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may be relied on by
this Court in rendering a decision regarding this issue.
Respondents1 reliance on Bradford v. Simpson, 541 P.2d 612
(Idaho, 1975) is misplaced as this case is not dispositive of the
- 5 -

case at bar.

The court in Bradford stated that affidavits

executed in support of a motion for new trial cannot be used to
establish facts which should have been but were not made part of
the record in the district court.

However, in the instant case,

Appellant

to

submitted

Reconsider,

not

affidavits

a Motion

for

support

a New

the

Trial.

Motion

to

Further, the

affidavits were submitted by different counsel than the counsel
present at the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The affidavits

executed in support of the Motion to Reconsider were facts which
could not have been made a part of the record earlier.

Thus, the

Bradford case is not dispositive of the matter.
In conclusion, the issue regarding the failure of the jurat
to give their notary commission expiration date and place of
residence may be heard by this Court.

The issue was before the

trial court and was considered by the court when ruling on
Defendants'
supporting

Motion

for

Appellant's

Summary

Judgement.

position

regarding

The
this

arguments
issue

presented to the trial court in its Motion to Reconsider.

were
As

such, the issue was properly raised at the trial court level
before seeking appellate review.

Further, all original papers

filed in the district court compose the record on appeal and may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Therefore, the affidavits

submitted to the trial court are a part of the record on appeal
and may be relied upon by the Supreme Court in rendering a
decision.
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II. VALLEY BANK WAS PROPERLY JOINED AS A PARTY TO THE
FORECLOSURE ACTION PRIOR TO THE FINAL HEARING OF THE CASE
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §§38-1-11 AND 38-1-13
(1953).
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-11 (1953) contains the general
time limitation for the commencement of the foreclosure action.
Respondents, at p. 28 of their brief, Contend that the two
requirements contained in Section 38-1-11 must be read in the
conjunctive.

The two requirements stated in Section 38-1-11

should be read in the disjunctive since they do not address the
same issues.
of

the

The first requirement deals with the commencement

foreclosure

action

and

the

second

deals with

the

preservation of the right to proceed against those not initially
joined to the action and those who acquire an interest in the
property after the commencement of the action.
The first requirement stated in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-11
(1953) is that the action be commenced

"within twelve months

after completion of the original contract, or the suspension of
work thereunder

for a period of thirty days."

The second

requirement of Section 38-1-11 is that once a foreclosure action
is commenced, or as it is being commenced, a lis pendens should
be filed within the same twelve month period to place those not
made parties to the action and those without actual knowledge of
the action on constructive notice of the pendency of the action.
Thus a mechanic's lien claimant preserves his right to proceed
against those parties claiming an interest in the property but
not yet joined

as parties to the action and against those

- 7 -

acquiring an interest in the property after the commencement of
the action.
The Respondents, at p. 29 of their brief, also contend that
the joinder and intervention rules of Section 38-1-13 apply only
to mechanic's lien claimants.

However, there are no specific

references to "mechanic's liens" or to "liens created under this
chapter"

as would be expected

if there was meant to be a

limitation on the application of the Section to mechanic's lien
claimants.

Contrary to Respondents' interpretation of the term

"lien" in Section 38-1-13, the term should be read in its generic
sense to include any encumbrance on the title of the property.
Clearly Section 38-1-13 was intended to be a general joinder and
intervention rule in mechanic's lien cases.
Respondents
Development

rely upon AAA

Fencing

and Energy Company, 714 P.2d

Company v. Raintree
289

(Utah 1986) to

support the decision by the trial court that all parties to a
mechanic's lien foreclosure action must be joined within twelve
months or the mechanic's lien claim is jurisdictionally barred.
However, Respondents have failed to identify the critical aspects
of that case, the mechanic's lien statute, and the case at bar.
In AAA Fencing, the facts were significantly different than
in the case presently before this Court and, therefore, easily
distinguishable.

In AAA Fencing, the mechanic's lien foreclosure

action was not commenced until fourteen months following the last
work on the project.

There was no foreclosure action for a non-

party to have actual knowledge of and there was no lis pendens to
- 8 -

impute constructive knowledge to a non-party.
present in the case at bar.

Both facts are

Appellant's foreclosure action was

unquestionably commenced within the requisite time period and
Appellant's

lis pendens

was

timely

filed.

Furthermore,

Respondents have admitted actual knowledge of the foreclosure
action.
Respondents' position that a person claiming an interest in
the property cannot be joined to a mechanic's lien foreclosure
action after the twelve month time period simply does not make
sense under the Utah mechanic's lien statutes.

An action to

foreclosure a mechanic's lien is an action against the property
and the title to the property rather than an action against
individuals.

Under the Utah mechanic's lien statutes, the only

requirements are that the mechanic's lien foreclosure action be
commenced within twelve months from the last date labor and/or
materials were provided to the project.

The fact that all

parties are not joined to the timely filed action is not relevant
until the time for the final hearing as stated in Utah Code
Annotated §38-1-13 (1953).

To accept Respondents' position on

this issue would be to nullify the joinder and intervention rules
stated in Section 38-1-13.
Furthermore, Respondents' position that a person claiming an
interest in the property cannot be joined to a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action after the twelve month time period is not
realistic

in the current

mechanic's lien statutes.

legal

system

and under the Utah

Under Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18
- 9 -

(1953 as amended), the successful party is entitled to be awarded
its costs and attorneys' fees.

Most often in a foreclosure

action it is unclear whether there is a basis for a claim of
priority over lending institutions until well into the discovery
stage of the litigation which is very frequently after the twelve
month time period has lapsed.

To require a plaintiff to name a

lending institution as a party to a mechanic's lien foreclosure
action until a claim of priority is borne out by the facts of the
case, would be unduly exposing such plaintiff to liability for
such lending institution's attorneys' fees and costs.

The only

equitable, as well as reasonable statutory, reading of Sections
38-1-11 and 38-1-13 is to allow the joinder of persons claiming
an interest in the property, and who have actual knowledge of the
foreclosure action or are deemed to have constructive knowledge
of the foreclosure action under a properly filed lis pendens,
until the final hearing on the case as stated in Section 38-1-13.
Once the final hearing on the case is commenced, the action is
void as to non-parties since they can no longer be joined to the
action.
In the case at bar, Appellant timely filed the foreclosure
action and timely filed its lis pendens.

Valley Bank had actual

knowledge of the prior and continuing construction work on the
project prior to making loans on the property.

Valley Bank had

actual knowledge of the foreclosure action by Appellant against
the property for which Valley Bank had made loans.

Appellant

joined Valley Bank as a party to the prior commencement of the
- 10 -

final hearing on the foreclosure action.

Therefore, Appellant

properly joined Valley Bank and the foreclosure action is not
jurisdictionally barred as against Valley Bank.
III. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS ACTION.
Several creative arguments are made in the Respondents'
brief relating to the award of attorneys' fees.

Nevertheless, as

Respondents failed to raise this issue at the trial court level,
they are precluded from raising the issue now.

Issues not timely

raised at the trial court level may not be raised for the first
time on appeal.

Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah,

1984).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the summary judgments entered against it
in favor of Respondent Copper State, Respondent Valley Bank and
Respondent Cottonwood Thrift and that this Court remand the case
for trial on the merits.

Furthermore, Appellant respectfully

requests that Respondents' request for attorneys' fees be denied.
DATED this 25th day of February, 1987.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By: ^Qn , vr,\l ^ , ^ W W < » k
Robelrt F.
Darrel J.
Attorneys
Appellant
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Bibcock
Bastwick
For Plaintiff/
Projects Unlimited
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, this 25th
day of February, 1987 to:
Mr. Jon C. Heaton
Mr. James A. Boevers
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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